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Abstract  Since  2000,  Cali  has  had  the  highest  mean  annual  homicide  rate  among  the  major
Colombian cities.  The  model  of  Mills  (1972)  is  extended  to  include  the  homicide  per  commune
(from 2005  to  2012)  as  a  measure  of  social  distance,  and  to  quantify  the  effect  of  this  phe-
nomenon on  land  prices  (mean  appraisals).  Using  an  annual  panel,  the  estimates  of  the  model  --
the family  violence  rate  being  the  instrumental  variable  --  show  that  an  increase  in  the  homicide
rate of  one  unit  reduces  the  appraisals  by  1.6%.  One  plausible  interpretation  is  that  homicides
operate as  a  regressive  tax  on  property  wealth  in  Cali  because  it  is  more  concentrated  in
the communes  of  the  lower  socio-economic  stratum,  systematically  expanding  the  intra-urban
social distance.
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PALABRAS  CLAVE
Resumen  Desde  el  an˜o  2000  Cali  tuvo  la  tasa  promedio  anual  de  homicidio  más  alta  entre  las
principales ciudades  colombianas.  Nosotros  ampliamos  el  modelo  de  Mills  (1972),  incluyendo  el
homicidio  por  comunas  (durante  2005-2012)  como  medida  de  distancia  social,  para  cuantiﬁcar
el efecto  de  este  fenómeno  sobre  los  precios  de  la  tierra  (avalúos  medios).  Empleando  datosCrimen;
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panel, las  estimaciones  del  modelo  ----  usando  la  violencia  familiar  como  variable  instrumental
---- evidencian  que  un  crecimiento  unitario  de  la  tasa  de  homicidio  reduce  los  avalúos  hasta  en∗ Corresponding author.
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un  1,6%.  Una  interpretación  plausible  es  que  el  homicidio  opera  como  un  impuesto  regresivo
sobre la  riqueza  inmueble,  pues  en  Cali  se  concentra  más  en  las  comunas  de  menor  estrato
socioeconómico,  ampliando  sistemáticamente  la  distancia  social  intraurbana.
© 2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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w. Introduction
he  economic  literature  has  been  interested  in  measur-
ng  the  implications  of  homicide  due  to  its  possible  impact
n  countries’  aggregate  performance.  However,  when  the
vent  occurs  near  a  house  or  real  property,  beyond  gener-
ting  a  possible  emotional  effect,  it  may  have  effects  on
he  microeconomic  scale  that  can  be  quantiﬁed.  This  paper
ims  to  reveal  the  magnitude  of  these  effects  on  varia-
les  such  as  the  wealth  of  individuals  and,  in  particular,
he  value  of  the  essential  property,  namely  land.  Moreover,
he  paper  constitutes  an  important  element  in  the  discus-
ion  of  optimal  applications  of  traditional  policies  against
rime.
The  mechanism  for  this  kind  of  study  that  has  prevailed
n  the  economic  literature  is  the  estimation  of  hedonic  price
odels.  However,  due  to  obvious  limitations  regarding  the
ata  volume  for  this  paper,  here  we  present  the  use  of  one
xtended  version  of  the  model  proposed  by  Mills  (1972).
n  advantage  of  this  model  is  that  it  enables  us  to  observe
he  spatial  urban  performance  of  land  prices  through  fric-
ion  (negative  effect)  generated  by  the  physical  distance
ith  respect  to  the  city  center  (hereinafter  DCC).  The  other
dvantage  of  extending  the  model  is  that  it  allows  us  to
dd  homicide  as  another  friction  element  but  concerning
he  social  distance.1
This  sociological  concept  is  relevant  because  its  vari-
bility  may  be  an  element  that  exacerbates  aggression  and
riminal  behavior  (Arteaga  and  Lara,  2004).  This  argument,
een  otherwise,  means  that  in  areas  with  higher  homicide
ates  --  which  could  be  those  that  are  the  poorest  or  have  a
ower  life  quality  --  vicious  circles  and  a  self-sustained  exten-
ion  of  social  distance  could  be  created  that  could  exert
 negative  impact  on  land  prices,  generating  an  adverse
ffect  on  the  wealth  of  individuals  or  households  and  thus
mpoverishing  them  more.
Considering  that  the  city  of  Cali  (Colombia)  has  presented
elatively  stable  homicide  rates  during  this  century  --  higher
ates  than  those  of  other  major  cities  in  the  country,  of
hich  the  location  seems  to  result  in  inertial  performance
n  some  areas  --  we  estimate  the  magnitude  of  the  homi-
ide  effect  on  land  prices,  approximated  by  mean  appraisals
f  the  plot  of  land  per  commune  (hereinafter  MAPC).  The
ata  come  from  a  panel  built  for  22  communes  of  the
ity  between  2005  and  2012,  obtained  from  public  sources,
hich  includes  interest  variables  and  some  controls  that
1 Bogardus (1965) deﬁned it as the degrees of understand-
ng and sympathy between people, between people and social
roups, and among social groups.
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euantify  amenities  and  economic  cycle  changes.  It  is  impor-
ant  to  emphasize  that  this  panel  is  the  most  complete  and
eliable  one  that  is  publicly  available  for  the  city,  although  it
enerates  restrictions  by  the  non-inclusion  of  more  periods
f  time  or  variables  that  are  considered  in  similar  research.
Given  the  model  structure  chosen  and  the  possibility  of
imultaneity  between  the  homicide  rate  and  the  land  price,
he  ﬁrst  set  of  estimates  was  made  following  the  ordinary
east  square  method  (hereinafter  OLS)  with  the  Hausman
ndogeneity  test  (1978).  However,  to  give  more  robustness
o  the  exercises,  a  second  set  of  estimates  was  produced
sing  least  squares  in  two  stages  (hereinafter  2SLS)  with  the
amily  violence  rate  as  the  instrumental  variable.
Among  the  most  important  results  of  the  two  sets  of
stimates,  we  found  that:  (i)  there  is  evidence  that  the
ity  does  not  have  a  monocentric  urban  structure,  (ii)  no
ndogeneity  exists  between  the  homicide  rate  and  the
and  price  and  (iii),  most  importantly,  according  to  the
LS  estimates,  there  is  evidence  that  when  the  homicide
ate  rises  by  one  unit,  the  MAPC  is  reduced  by  a  value  that
scillates  between  0.5  and  1.1%  under  the  estimated  model;
n  addition,  the  range  of  values  can  reach  1.66  percentage
oints  based  on  the  results  of  the  2SLS  estimates.  This  shows
hat  the  homicide  rate  generates  a  signiﬁcant  negative
ealth  effect  on  individuals,  which  could  be  interpreted
s  a  regressive  tax  because  it  has  a  proportional  impact
n  the  wealth  of  the  poorest  --  the  lowest  stratum  --  and
easonably  can  be  assumed  to  be  a  factor  that  expands  the
ocial  distance  between  the  city  communes.
From  this  we  infer  that  the  homicide  rate  impoverishes
he  poorest  people  systematically.  This  derivation  reiterates
he  importance  of  improving  the  management  efﬁciency  of
he  anti-homicide  public  policy  as  well  as  the  care  that
he  government  and  research  agencies  should  take  to  dis-
eminate  ciphers  about  this  kind  of  crime.  To  achieve  this
esult,  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In  Section  2,  we
escribe  some  stylized  facts  about  the  phenomenon  in  Cali.
n  Section  3  we  discuss  some  previous  works  available  in  the
iterature.  In  Sections  4--6,  we  lay  out  the  theoretical  and
ethodological  speciﬁcations  of  our  analysis.  In  Sections  7
nd  8,  we  present  the  empirical  results.  Finally,  in  Section  9,
e  present  our  main  conclusions.
. Some stylized facts
ollowing  the  UNODC  (2014), the  top  ﬁve  of  the  countries
n  the  global  context  with  the  highest  average  homicide
ate  between  2000  and  2012  are  Honduras  (62.5  homicides
er  100,000  inhabitants),  followed  by  El  Salvador  (52.1),
amaica  (48.8),  Colombia  (44.4)  and  Venezuela  (43.2).  How-
ver,  according  to  the  Vice  President  of  the  Republic  of
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Figure  1  Mean  appraisal  of  plot  of  land  per  commune  (MAPC)
2012.
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Colombia,  Cali  exceeds  these  measurements,  reaching  an
average  of  79.  This  situation  involves  dramatic  differences,
because,  in  the  same  period,  the  city  presented  the  high-
est  rate  among  the  13  major  cities  in  Colombia,2 followed
by  Medellin  (78.8),  Pereira  (76)  and  Cucuta  (75),  but  with
the  aggravating  factor  that  in  these  cities  the  rate’s  vari-
ability  was  greater3 and  followed  a  downward  trend,  while
in  Cali  the  rate  remained  stable.  For  example,  in  Medellin
the  average  rate  variance  was  −4.34%,  while  in  Cali  it  was
only  −0.8%.
Although  it  is  not  the  focus  of  this  work,  it  is  convenient
to  mention  that  this  scenario  is  attributed,  among  other
things,  to  the  inﬂuence  of  drug  trafﬁcking  and  crime,  the
widespread  use  of  ﬁrearms  as  a  victimizing  mechanism  and
the  stability  in  the  localization  of  a  large  number  of  murders
in  the  areas  or  communities  with  the  poorest  life  quality
indicators  (Concha  et  al.,  2002;  Observatorio  Social  de  Cali,
2011;  Loaiza,  2012;  Escobedo,  2013).
Therefore,  it  is  plausible  that  a  serious  phenomenon  has
an  impact  on  the  real  wealth  of  individuals.  In  the  case  of
Cali,  the  possible  relationship  between  the  homicide  rate
and  the  value  of  real  property  has  not  been  studied  so
far,  except  for  parts  of  Delgado’s  (2012)  work  and  some
descriptive  evidence.  For  example,  the  overall  view  shown
in  Figs.  1  and  2  warns  of  an  inverse  association  between  the
MAPC  and  the  homicide  rate  in  2012.
It  is  necessary  to  be  aware  that,  while  the  highest  homi-
cide  rates  are  concentrated  in  eastern  and  western  hillside
communes  (excluding  commune  1)  accompanied  by  a  com-
paratively  lower  appraisal,4 the  opposite  happens  in  the
communes  with  a  higher  appraisal  (except  commune  22)  that
share  lower  homicide  rates,  placed  in  parallel  to  the  ﬁfth
and  tenth  streets,  the  main  longitudinal  streets  of  the  city.
Likewise,  an  intermediate  group  of  communes  --  including
commune  3,  where  the  DCC  is  located  --  involves  simi-
lar  quartiles  for  homicide  and  appraisal  on  the  two  maps,
considering  that  these  are  presented  inverted.
In  addition,  Fig.  3  shows  that  the  inverse  correlation
between  the  variables  --  in  both  cases  measured  as  the  aver-
age  over  the  period  2005--2012  --  can  be  considered  as  a
stylized  fact.  Despite  the  time  period  not  being  sufﬁciently
large  to  analyze  more  structural  dynamics  as  a  proxy  for  land
prices,  some  inertia  may  be  noticed  in  them  as  well  as  in  the
homicide  rate.
3. BackgroundThis  article  contributes  to  the  extensive  literature  on  the
effects  of  crime  on  the  value  of  real  property  and  mostly
assumes  endogeneity  (by  simultaneity)  between  these  varia-
bles,  focusing  on  OLS  and  2SLS  estimates  (with  instrumental
2 The group of cities and metropolitan areas deﬁned by the
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) for some
of its statistical operations. It consists of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali,
Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Manizales, Pasto, Pereira, Cúcuta, Mon-
tería, Neiva, Cartagena and Villavicencio.
3 The standard deviations were in the following order: Cali: 10.6,
Medellin: 54.6, Pereira: 22 and Cucuta: 31.7.
4 Cadastral appraisal: the value of properties for tax purposes and
ﬁscal relations with the State.
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ariables).  Many  studies  have  used  hedonic  pricing  models  to
etermine  individuals’  willingness  to  pay  to  avoid  the  effects
f  crime  on  the  price  of  their  assets.
For  example,  Buonanno  et  al.  (2012)  analyzed  the  real
state  market  data  and  a  victimization  survey  for  Barcelona
etween  2004  and  2006;  the  authors  estimated  that  the
rime  perception  affects  negatively  the  property  prices.
n  addition  to  crime,  Troy  and  Grove  (2008)  included  the
ariable  ‘‘live  near  a park,’’  showing  that,  in  the  case  of
altimore  in  2004,  the  effect  of  that  variable  is  positive  as
ong  as  the  park  has  lower  rates  of  rape  and  robbery.
Meanwhile,  Pontes  et  al.  (2011)  estimated  the  cost  of
rime  implicit  in  the  prices  of  the  residences  of  Belo
orizonte  in  2004  with  the  aim  of  capturing  individuals’  will-
ngness  to  pay  to  live  in  safer  areas.  Their  most  important
iscovery  was  that  robberies  of  passers-by  affect  the  price  of
roperties  in  a  greater  proportion  than  homicides,  because
he  former  occur  more  frequently.  In  addition,  Gaviria  et  al.
2008)  found  that  Bogota’s  households  in  higher  socioeco-
omic  strata  pay  more  for  their  property  to  avoid  an  increase
n  homicide  rates.  To  achieve  this,  they  used  data  from  the
003  Survey  of  Life  Quality.  A  similar  exercise  was  carried
ut  by  Bishop  and  Murphy  (2011)  through  the  estimation  of dynamic  demand  model  that  showed  that,  for  the  period
990--2008,  California  Bay  households  were  willing  to  pay
S$472  on  average  per  year  to  avoid  a  10%  increase  in  the
rime  rate.
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Figure  2  Homicide  rate  per  100,000  people  per  commune  in
2012 (constant  2008  prices).
1 2 
3: DCC
4
5
6
7 
8
9
10
11
12 
13 
14
15
16 
17
18 
19
20
21
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
$ 150$ 125$ 100$ 75$ 50$ 25$ 0
H
om
ic
id
e 
ra
te
 
pe
r 1
00
 0
00
 p
eo
pl
e 
Mean appraisal of plot of land (MAPC)–COP millions (2008=100)
F
m
a
b
t
U
b
o
C
c
c
i
m
t
d
a
p
p
2
p
t
h
o
r
u
f
t
t
i
d
t
C
t
m
a
d
M
h
t
e
a
a
b
h
m
t
a
e
h
c
i
a
a
i
a
c
e
3
t
e
ﬁ
a
c
C
tigure  3  Land  price  ratio  vs.  homicides  per  Cali  commune,
ean 2005--2012.
On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  instrumental  variables
llowed  Pope  and  Pope  (2012)  to  ﬁnd  an  inverse  relationship
etween  the  presence  of  crime  and  the  property  values  in
he  cases  of  twelve  states  and  ﬁve  metropolitan  areas  in  the
nited  States  during  the  1990s.  A  similar  result  was  obtained
y  Ihlanfeldt  and  Mayock  (2010)  from  a  panel  composed
f  information  on  tax  and  criminal  incidents  in  Miami-Dade
ounty  properties  between  1999  and  2007.  Using  commer-
ial  land  use  variables  as  instruments  revealed  that  the
rime  density  explains  the  variation  in  the  housing  price
ndex  and  that  aggravated  theft  is  the  crime  that  has  the
ost  negative  effects.
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Impact  assessment  has  also  been  used  as  a  tool  to  study
his  research  topic,  in  particular  with  the  differences-in-
ifferences  method.  In  the  case  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Frischtak
nd  Mandel  (2012)  analyzed  the  impact  of  the  system  of
olice  stations  in  low-income  areas  on  crime  and  real  estate
rices.  The  exercises,  conducted  with  data  from  2008  to
011,  showed  that  new  stations  produce  a  substantial  and
ositive  effect  on  property  prices  but  a  negative  one  on  cer-
ain  crimes;  they  also  showed  that  the  historical  crime  rate
as  persistent  effects  on  real  estate  values.
Likewise,  Klimova  and  Lee  (2014)  measured  the  impact
f  the  occurrence  of  homicides  on  property  prices  and  their
ents  in  Sydney.  The  researchers  found  that  real  estate  val-
es  were  reduced  by  almost  4%  for  properties  --  with  similar
eatures  --  located  some  distance  from  the  venue.  However,
hey  found  no  effect  of  the  homicides  on  rental  prices.
On  the  other  hand,  this  article  also  contributes  to
he  broad  local  literature  that  has  studied  homicide
n  Cali  city.  Many  of  these  studies  were  based  on
escriptive  analysis,  especially  those  undertaken  since
he  1990s  (Concha  et  al.,  2002;  Observatorio  Social  de
ali,  2011;  Loaiza,  2012;  Escobedo,  2013),  highlighting
he  inﬂuence  of  drug  trafﬁcking  on  the  criminal  and
urderous  dynamics,  the  widespread  use  of  ﬁrearms
s  a  victimizing  element,  the  stable  decreasing  ten-
ency  of  data  from  other  cities,  like  Bogota  and
edellin,  and  inertia  in  the  high-density  locations  of
omicide.
Given  the  above,  another  line  of  research  has  analyzed
he  phenomenon  from  the  geographical  point  of  view;  for
xample,  Ortiz  (2010)  characterized  the  neighborhoods  with
 high  concentration  of  homicides,  asserting  that  they  have
 lower  life  quality,  measured  by  indicators  of  unsatisﬁed
asic  needs.  However,  he  added  that  another  factor  that
as  an  impact  on  a major  criminal  presence  is  the  location  of
assive  and  poorly  regulated  economic  activities  affecting
he  urban  environment,  such  as  marketplaces  and  recreation
nd  leisure  sites.  Meanwhile,  Loaiza  (2012)  found  that  west-
rn  and  eastern  slope  areas  adjacent  to  the  Cauca  River
ave  a  higher  probability  of  homicide  and  included  this  in
alculating  the  homicide  propensity  index  per  commune.
Inferential  statistics  has  also  been  used  to  study  the
ssue;  based  on  this  methodology,  Vásquez  (2010)  found
 positive  association  between  unemployment  and  crime
nd  then  related  the  economic  situation  to  the  possibil-
ty  of  being  a  victim  of  theft  or  murder,  concluding  that
 crisis  situation  can  lead  to  a  greater  likelihood  of  homi-
ide.  At  the  same  time,  using  a Poisson  regression,  Arango
t  al.  (2009)  estimated  that  men  aged  between  20  and
0  years  have  a  greater  relative  risk  of  being  killed  and
hat  guns  are  the  most  common  weapon  used  by  victimiz-
rs.  Furthermore,  Díaz  and  Graffe  (2014)  discovered  using
xed-effect  estimates  that  variables  such  as  the  education
ccess  rate,  cultural  service  coverage  and  security  service
overage  are  signiﬁcant  in  explaining  the  homicide  rate  in
ali  per  commune  between  2002  and  2012.
Finally,  this  paper  contributes  to  the  sparse  local  litera-
ure  that  relates  crime  to  land  prices.  In  that  sense,  Delgado
2012)  used  a  panel  for  the  period  2000--2010  to  demonstrate
hat  overcrowding,  preferential  service  coverage  and  pop-
lation  age  composition  --  the  majority  being  between  16
nd  24  years  old  --  are  signiﬁcant  in  explaining  the  homicide
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rate  in  the  city;  however,  he  included  the  mean  appraisal
of  properties  as  a  control  variable.  According  to  his  esti-
mates,  an  increase  of  1  million  COP  in  this  variable  reduces
the  homicide  rate  by  0.16.  Nevertheless,  Delgado’s  work
(2012),  unlike  the  present  paper,  did  not  consider  the  possi-
ble  simultaneity  between  these  variables  --  the  endogeneity
source  --  that  would  prevent  the  estimates,  as  above,  from
being  biased  and  over-  or  underestimating  the  parameter
for  appraisals.
4. The model
Mills  (1972)  described  the  urban  spatial  performance  of  land
prices  and  predicted  that  there  is  an  inverse  relationship
between  land  prices  and  distance  from  the  main  center
(DCC)  that  could  be  represented  by  a  decreasing  exponential
function.  The  theoretical  foundation  of  this  relationship  is
that  the  highest  land  prices  in  cities  are  in  the  DCC,  because
the  economic  activities  that  attract  households  and  ﬁrms  are
concentrated  in  the  DCC.  This  model  is  part  of  the  family  of
seminal  space  economy  models  proposed  by  Von  Thünen.5
Mathematically,  the  model  is  written  in  the  following
way:
Pi =  EXP(ˇ0 +  ˇ1Di)  (1)
where  Pi is  the  plot  of  land  price  i,  EXP(ˇ0)  is  the  mean  land
price  in  the  DCC  and  ˇ1 <  0  is  the  price--distance  gradient,
which  measures  the  decline  grade  in  the  land  price  while
the  plot  of  land  i moves  away  from  the  DCC  at  a  distance  Di.
Expression  (1)  describes  a  monocentric  city  structure;
however,  this  system  may  be  weakened  if  the  land  price  in
the  DCC  is  reduced  below  that  of  other  areas,  which  could
be  due,  among  many  factors  that  will  not  be  investigated
in  depth  here,  to  the  rise  of  new  and  improved  commercial
sites  inside  these  areas  and/or  to  the  search  by  households
located  in  residential  areas  with  a  lower  population  density.
To  predict  this  situation,  we  propose  an  extension  model  as
follows:
Pi =  EXP(ˇ0 +  ˇ1Di +  ˇ2D2i )  (2)
Given  (2),  if  ˇ2 >  0,  the  city  would  not  be  monocentric,
because  from  a  certain  plot  of  land  i  the  land  prices  may  be
incremented  by  a  greater  distance  from  the  DCC.
On  the  other  hand,  in  relation  to  the  distance,  although
it  is  logical  in  a  spatial  economy  context  to  measure  it
in  physical  units  and  accessibility  to  the  DCC,  underly-
ing  this  concept  is  the  fact  that  it  can  be  analyzed  as  a
friction  factor  on  land  prices,  which  opens  up  the  possi-
bility  to  measure  the  distance  through  variables  that  also
reﬂect  friction  as  a  social  distance  or,  conversely,  reduce  it
with  amenities.  Accordingly,  the  model  can  be  formulated
thus:
Pi =  EXP(ˇ0 +  ˇ1Di +  ˇ2D2i +  ˇ3H  +  ˇ4)  (3)
5 This classic model determines the collective conﬁguration about
land use and rent, of which the main feature is the manufacturers’
concentration in a central city (Masahisa et al., 1999).
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For  (3)  it  would  be  expected  that  ˇ3 <  0  and  ˇ4 >  0.6
hese  signs  may  be  explained  as  follows:  in  relation  to
menities  (),  they  are  factors  that  increase  the  welfare  of
andowners  and,  by  deﬁnition,  improve  their  market  value.
mong  them,  Gaviria  et  al.  (2008)  included  access  and  qual-
ty  of  public  goods  and  services  (roads,  parks  and  green
reas,  transport  and  security,  among  others).
Regarding  social  distance  (H),  in  the  concept  of  sociolog-
cal  studies,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  main  idea  for
his  research,  which  is  reﬂected  by  criminal  behavior  and
onﬂict,  in  our  case  by  the  homicide  rate  per  area.  As  all
he  distances  in  the  model,  it  is  a  friction  mechanism  on
and  prices  with  the  difference  that  if  the  wealth  and  con-
equently  the  life  quality  are  reduced,  it  could  replicate
tself,  generating  a  trap  exerting  adverse  effects  on  the  real
roperty  value.
.  Data
he  data  were  taken  from  the  Cali  en  Cifras  documents
or  the  period  2005--2012,  and  the  spatial  units  are  the
2  communes  of  the  city.  Government  agencies  such  as
etro  Cali  S.A.  and  DAGMA  (Administrative  Department  of
nvironmental  Management,  with  its  acronym  in  Spanish)
ere  consulted  as  well.  This  allowed  us  to  build  panel
ata  consisting  of  176  observations.7 The  land  prices  were
pproximated  by  the  MAPC  deﬂated  by  the  2008  prices.
he  homicide  rate  and  family  violence  rate  (reported  cases)
ere  calculated  per  100,000  habitants.  Other  variables  used
or  each  commune  were:  physical  distance  from  the  DCC,
tratum  mode  as  an  income  proxy  variable  and,  as  amenities,
anks,  malls  with  cinemas,  marketplaces,  a  public  transport
tation  system  (MIO)  and  large  parks  (see  Appendix  1).
Table  1 shows  some  characteristics  of  the  variables.  It
an  be  seen  that  the  5  communes  --  including  commune  3,
here  the  DCC  is  located  --  that  present  the  highest  mean
omicide  rates  have  strata  between  1  and  3,  contrary  to
he  5  communes  that  show  lower  values.  This  reinforces  the
mportance  of  the  social  distance  concept  to  the  explanation
f  the  criminal  phenomenon.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  note-
orthy  that  both  commune  2  and  commune  19  are  bordered
y  communes  with  a  lower  stratum  and  mean  appraisal,  such
s  communes  1  and  20  (see  Figs.  1  and  2).  This  shows  that
he  socio-economic  conﬁguration  of  the  city  in  that  area  is
ot  monotonous  and  presents  a  polarization  or  rupture  that
s  more  evident  when  looking  at  commune  20,  which  has  the
teepest  mean  both  in  family  violence  and  in  homicide,  in
onjunction  with  the  lowest  appraisals.
Last  but  not  least,  it  is  appropriate  to  reiterate  that,  in
he  light  of  other  research,  the  inclusion  of  other  variables
nd  longer  periods  of  time  is  considered  technically  justiﬁ-
ble;  however,  it  is  pertinent  to  note  that  the  information
ollected,  despite  its  restrictions,  is  the  most  reliable  and
omplete  that  is  publicly  available  on  the  city.
6 Following the concepts of the original Mills model, ˇ3 can be
alled the ‘‘price -- social distance gradient’’ and in this study the
‘price -- homicide gradient.’’
7 Cali en Cifras is a publication of the Municipal Planning Depart-
ent of the Mayor’s ofﬁce in Cali, which collects data from different
ources and indicators about the city with a one-year lag.
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Table  1  Descriptive  statistics.
Commune  Homicide  rate  Mean  appraisal
of  plot  of  land  (MAPC)
(COP  millions--2008  =  100)
Distance  Family  violence  rate  Stratum
Mean  Stand.
deviation
Mean  Stand.
deviation
Mean  Stand.
deviation
Mean  Stand.
deviation
Mode  Stand.
deviation
20  132.1  25.3  5.9  5.2  8.1  0  891.5  174.0  1  0.0
9 130.8  22.1  33.6  10.6  2.0  0  451.8  145.2  3  0.0
3 127.6  23.5  36.8  5.2  0.4  0  348.9  124.9  3  0.0
13 106.1  15.3  63.5  32.2  6.6  0  465.1  145.6  2  0.0
15 104.8  14.4  25.2  10.6  8.0  0  272.0  68.3  2  0.5
22 102.7  36.5  160.5  9.3  13.0  0  107.5  94.1  6  0.0
12 101.1 14.2 33.8  14.7  7.1  0  352.8  128.6  3  0.0
4 99.9  20.8  57.2  21.4  6.0  0  507.6  179.6  2  0.5
14 93.2  13.8  23.9  6.9  8.8  0  331.3  98.0  1  0.0
21 90.5  20.5  56.6  27.9  11.7  0  292.7  92.0  1  0.0
7 87.2  26.7  32.1  4.1  7.5  0  504.4  148.7  3  0.0
16 81.8  14.7  44.8  18.6  7.2  0  271.0  61.6  2  0.0
11 73.6 13.4  33.8  14.2  4.8  0  256.8  74.8  3  0.0
8 72.4  13.3  24.9  7.9  4.5  0  305.2  100.5  3  0.0
18 61.3 10.4  24.2  11.1  7.7  0  474.9  76.6  1  1.0
10 58.7  10.1  30.3  6.6  5.8  0  340.3  115.3  3  0.0
6 52.7 13.3  72.9  32.4  8.2  0  367.5  114.3  2  0.0
1 50.7 12.4 31.7  15.0  3.6  0  317.3  97.8  1  0.0
19 46.0 8.3 109.5 13.7  3.5  0  237.1  49.4  4  0.5
2 42.6 8.4 143.3  24.6  4.2  0  160.6  55.1  5  0.0
17 33.5 7.7 86.2 16.0  11.0  0  177.8  34.5  5  0.0
5 24.6 3.5 75.9  13.7  4.4  0  156.0  46.1  3  0.0
Average 80.6  54.8  6.5  345.0  3
009, 
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. Methodological strategy
.1.  OLS  speciﬁcation
ollowing  Eq.  (3),  the  Mills  extended  model  can  be  estimated
ith  cross-sectional  data,  which  would  compel  us,  if  we
anted  to  study  the  price  dynamic,  to  suppose  statistical
ndependence  between  time  periods.  Castan˜o  (1986)  pro-
osed  the  ﬁrst  method  to  overcome  this  problem  by  means  of
 quasi-dynamic  estimation  that  extends  the  original  model
o  capture  the  intertemporal  dependence  among  observa-
ions.  However,  the  development  of  panel  data  estimations
ould  resolve  this  problem,  as  it  did  for  Burbano  (2005)  in
he  case  of  Cali.  In  this  sense  the  ﬁrst  step  is  to  linearize  Eq.
3),  so  that:
n(Pit)  =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1Dit +  ˇ2D2it +  ˇ3Hit +  ˇ4it +  it (4)
The  theoretical  model  structure,  in  which  the  price  in  the
CC  is  the  same  as  that  for  all  the  city8 (to  each  observed
nit  or  commune),  obligates  the  dismissal  of  a  random-
ffect  estimation.  Likewise,  it  removes  the  possibility  of
onducting  a  ﬁxed-effect  estimation,  since  the  physical  dis-
ance  (Dit)  does  not  change  in  time,  which  would  absorb
his  kind  of  effect  due  to  the  coefﬁcient  or  ˇ2 parameter
8 This is equal to saying that the lineal function has an intercept.
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ot  being  estimable.  Given  this,  the  estimation  will  follow
he  OLS  method.  Accordingly,  (4)  may  increase  its  explica-
ive  power  by  including  dummy  variables  for  time  periods
hat  capture  the  differential  effects  of  each  lapse    in  the
ean  land  in  the  DCC,  so  that:
n(Pit)  =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1Dit +  ˇ2D2it +  ˇ3Hit +  ˇ4it +  · ·  ·ˇkt +  it
(5)
With  the  above,  the  ﬁrst  estimation  group  of  this  work
roposes  regressions  based  on  Eqs.  (4)  and  (5)  but  seek-
ng  to  corroborate  hypotheses  of  signiﬁcance  and  a  negative
alue  of ̂ˇ3. Additionally,  given  the  literature  ﬁndings,  we
ill  perform  the  Hausman  (1978)  test  to  contrast  the  endo-
eneity  hypothesis  --  by  simultaneity  --  between  the  land
rice  and  the  homicide  rate  (H)  by  comparing  estimations  (4)
nd  (5)  with  restricted  auxiliary  regressions  of  them  without
ncluding  H  and  verifying  the  hypothesis  about  the  signiﬁcant
ifferences  in  the  estimators.
.2.  2SLS  speciﬁcation.2.1.  Instrument  properties
n  addition,  to  give  robustness  to  the  results  correcting  the
upposed  endogeneity  problems,  we  propose  a  2SLS  esti-
ation  set  using  the  family  violence  rate  (cases  reported
ali  153
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Figure  4  Gaussian  kernels  of  the  principal  variables  (in  all  the
estimations,  we  utilize  the  participation  of  each  observation  in
the mean  of  itself)  --  distribution  by  communes.
Source:  Calculation  with  Wessa  (2012)  and  data  from  Cali  en
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per  100,000  people)  as  an  instrumental  variable.  The  choice
of  this  variable  (hereafter  IV)  assumes  that  it  is  positively
associated  with  the  homicide  rate,  so  that:
Hit =  ˛0 +  ˛1Dit +  ˛2D2it +  ˛3IVit +  ˛4it +  ·  ·  ·˛kt +  ωit (6)
Finding  evidence  that  ̂˛3 >  0  and  is  statistically  signif-
icant  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  IV  is  relevant.  On  the
other  hand,  we  suppose  that  IV  does  not  affect  the  land
price  directly,  which  implies  --  in  the  presence  of  enough
empirical  evidence  --  that  it  is  exogenous.  To  test  this  last
condition,  Bernal  and  Pen˜a  (2011)  proposed  to  estimate  (4)
or  (5),  according  to  the  case,  and  later  to  run  an  auxiliary
regression:
̂it =  0 +  2IVit +  ϑit (7)
where  ̂it is  the  predicted  residual  of  (4)  or  (5).  If  the  null
hypothesis  that  ˜2 =  0  is  not  rejected,  we  will  have  evidence
in  favor  of  the  instrument.  Additionally,  it  must  contrast  the
endogeneity  of  the  instrumented  variable  (H),  because  if  it
was  exogenous  the  estimation  with  IV  would  not  be  neces-
sary.  This  is  shown  with  the  Hausman  test,  but  in  this  case  the
OLS  and  2SLS  estimators  are  compared  and  the  null  hypoth-
esis  that  H  may  be  treated  as  exogenous  is  contrasted.  If  it
is  not  rejected,  there  will  be  evidence  that  OLS  is  a  more
efﬁcient  method  than  2SLS.
Moreover,  Baum  et  al.  (2007)  performed  identiﬁcation
tests  (over,  under  and  weak  identiﬁcation)  of  the  2SLS  esti-
mations.  This  condition  requires  the  exclusion  of  at  least
the  same  number  of  exogenous  variables  as  the  explana-
tory  variables  included  in  the  structural  equation;  thus,  the
2SLS  method  will  generate  consistent  estimators.  Under-
identiﬁcation  indicates  that  the  excluded  instruments  are
relevant,  that  is,  correlated  with  the  endogenous  regres-
sor  (H).  On  the  other  side,  over-identiﬁcation  implies  that
there  are  more  instruments  than  needed  to  estimate  the
parameters  consistently.  As  regards  the  problem  of  instru-
ment  weakness,  it  is  explained  as  a  relevance  problem  of
the  endogenous  regressor.
Following  these  authors,  for  under-identiﬁcation  we
will  execute  the  Sanderson--Windmeijer  (Chi2)9 test  and
the  Kleibergen--Paap  LM  test.  Regarding  over-identiﬁcation,
we  will  apply  the  Hansen’s  J,  and  for  instrument  weak-
ness  we  will  conduct  the  Sanderson--Windmeijer  (F),
Anderson--Rubin,  Stock--Wright  and  Kleibergen--Paap  Wald
tests.  It  must  be  highlighted  that  these  tests  are  consistent
with  standard  errors  that  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity.
6.2.2.  Instrument  justiﬁcation
The  use  of  the  instrumental  variable  is  justiﬁed  by  the  data,
which  appear  to  reveal  their  positive  association  with  the
instrumented  variable.  The  correlation  coefﬁcient  between
the  means  of  the  two  controls  --  for  the  2005--2015  period  --  is
0.55;  meanwhile,  the  univariate  kernel  density  estimations
show  a  similar  performance  in  the  concentration  pattern
of  the  probabilistic  mass,  especially  in  2005  and  2012  (see
Fig.  4).  Contrary  to  this,  the  probabilistic  patterns  of  the
9 In the case of one instrument, its value is equal to the
Cragg--Donald Wald test (when the errors are homoskedastic)
or the Kleiberger--Paap Wald test (with standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity).
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and  price  variable  and  the  instrumental  variable  seem  not
o  be  associated.
Finally,  the  use  of  this  variable  is  also  validated  by  the
iterature,  especially  in  studies  about  abuse  and  intra-home
iolence.  For  example,  according  to  Van  De  Weijer  et  al.
2015),  violent  crimes  could  be  a  manifestation  of  an  aggres-
ive  feature  that  may  also  be  expressed  by  aggressive  and
iolent  behavior  in  daily  life.  It  implies  that  the  children
f  violent  parents  could  have  a greater  propensity  to  witness
nd  acquire  the  violent  behavior  catalog  of  their  parents
han  children  of  non-violent  parents.
In  other  words,  crime  transmission  could  be  intergener-
tional  and  a  consequence  of  social  learning  mechanisms
f  the  children  imitate  and  adopt  the  criminal  behavior  of
heir  parents.  Identically,  Pollak  (2002)  presented  a  theo-
etical  model  to  predict  the  effects  of  being  a  witness  of
iolence  between  the  parents  on  the  probability  that  the
hildren  will  become  violent  in  their  own  marriages,  in  the
ictim  or  victimizer  role.
Complementarily,  Van  De  Weijer  et  al.  (2014)  demon-
trated  that  paternal  violence  during  early  childhood
eightens  the  risk  that  individuals  will  become  violent  crim-
nals.  On  the  other  hand,  Loureiro  et  al.  (2009),  using  data
rom  the  state  jail  in  Brazil,  estimated  by  means  of  the  pro-
it  model  that  the  variable  ‘‘was  physically  abused  in  excess
y  your  parents’’  is  signiﬁcant  in  the  explanation  of  vio-
ent  crimes  such  as  homicide  and  rape.  Likewise,  the  logistic
egressions  run  by  Herrera  and  McCloskey  (2001),  with  pop-
lation  data  from  southwest  intermediate  cities  in  the  USA,
evealed  that  during  the  1990s  witnessing  marital  violence
as  associated  with  teenage  crime.  The  same  applies  to
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hild  abuse  in  relation  to  violent  crimes,  especially  in  young
omen.
. OLS analysis results
ccording  to  Table  2,  the  presence  of  malls  and  public
ransport  stations  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  land  prices,
enoting  that  proximity  to  commercial  nodes  and  public
obility  equipment  that  are  similar  to  those  localized  in
he  DCC  increases  land  prices.  Nevertheless,  the  presence  of
anks,  marketplaces  and  large  parks  has  the  opposite  effect.
n  the  case  of  banks  -- measured  per  area  unit  --  the  effect
ay  be  due  to  the  values  in  communes  2  and  20,  which  were
pproximated  with  the  values  of  the  nearby  communes  (1
nd  19),  and  the  two  commune  pairs  are  very  different  in
heir  appraisals  (see  Appendix  1).  Consequently,  there  is  a
ariable  that  shows  the  same  endowments  but  in  the  pres-
nce  of  a  notable  land  price  polarization.  This  also  affects
he  high  value  in  the  DCC,  the  appraisal  of  which  in  the
bserved  period  is  below  the  mean  of  all  the  communes.
In  the  case  of  parks  and  marketplaces,  the  results  agree
ith  the  explication  by  Ortiz  (2010)  as  regards  the  presence
f  this  kind  of  space,  like  urban  space  fractures,  which,
ith  an  inefﬁcient  watch,  may  be  complicit  with  other
inds  of  violent  crime  that  generate  adverse  effects  on  the
eal  estate  prices,  which  is  also  consistent  with  the  results
xposed  by  Troy  and  Grove  (2008).
Regarding  the  physical  distance,  the  signs  were  as
xpected;  that  is,  there  is  a  contraction  of  the  mean  price
er  commune  with  a  greater  distance  from  the  DCC  as  well
s  an  increase  for  distances  greater  than  7.7  km  (commune
8)  from  the  same  area.  This  could  be  calculated  from  model
XI)10 supposing  all  the  variables  except  the  distance  to  be
ull;  see  Fig.  5a  (Mills  version).  This  would  show  that  the  city
oes  not  have  a  monocentric  structure,  although  the  eco-
omic  cycle  effects  expose  growth  in  the  appraisals  in  this
one  since  2005.  This,  additionally,  is  congruent  with  the
ity’s  expansion  to  the  south  zone  (communes  17  and  22),
hich  has  been  accompanied  by  high  appraisals  for  decades.
In  relation  to  the  variable  of  interest  for  this  research,
he  estimation  shows  that  --  everything  else  being  con-
tant  --  it  is  signiﬁcant.  The  estimated  parameter  evidences
hat,  when  the  annual  homicide  rate  rises  by  1  unit,  the
APC  is  reduced  by  a  value  that  oscillates  between  0.5%
nd  1.1%,  according  to  the  estimated  model.  This,  besides
eing  consistent  with  the  literature  mentioned  previously,
mplies  a  negative  wealth  effect  that  is  very  important  to
ake  as  a  reference;  for  example,  there  were  7  communes
ith  mean  homicide  rates  that  exceeded  100  units  during
he  observation  period.  Even  more,  if  commune  22,  which
as  stratum  6,  is  excluded  from  this  group,  we  can  see  that
he  others  are  distributed  between  stratus  1  and  stratus
,  revealing  that  homicide  is  a  social  distance  factor  that
nforces  friction  on  the  land  price.
Verifying  the  economic  magnitude  of  this  friction  in  the
stimation  is  important;  see  again  Fig.  5  (left),  the  series
10 This model was chosen to present the lesser values of the
kaike and Bayesian statistics used for the OLS model selection (see
ppendix 2).
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‘estimated  (homicide  rate  =  0)’’  --  which  was  created  with
he  estimated  parameters  in  model  (XI)  calculated  with  data
or  the  year  2012  --  allows  us  to  appreciate  the  estimated
ppraisal  with  that  structure  supposing  that  there  are  no
omicides.  The  gap  between  such  a  series  and  the  estimated
ne,  including  the  real  values  of  the  homicide  rate,  approach
 mean  value  per  commune  of  almost  22  COP  million
12.442  USD).11
On  the  other  side,  as  we  anticipated  in  the  methodologi-
al  section,  we  ran  the  Hausman  (1978)  test  (see  Appendix
)  and  the  results  evince  that  (except  models  II,  III,  V  and
II)  we  cannot  reject  the  exogeneity  hypothesis  between  the
omicide  rate  and  the  land  prices.  In  other  words,  the  OLS
stimations  exposed  in  this  section  are  consistent.
. 2SLS analysis results
o  show  the  research’s  robustness,  we  ran  regressions  fol-
owing  the  2SLS  method,  employing  the  family  violence  rate
er  commune  as  an  instrumental  variable.  The  results  (see
able  3)  are  even  more  interesting;  however,  before  analyz-
ng  them  it  is  necessary  to  comment  that  the  reading  of  the
stimations  supports  statistically  the  endogeneity  hypothe-
is  of  the  homicide  rate  in  models  (i),  (iii)  and  (iv),  which
s  congruent  with  the  Hausman  test  results  in  the  previous
ection.  It  is  implied  that  the  OLS  estimator  may  be  more
fﬁcient  in  the  remaining  models.  According  to  the  endo-
eneity  test  of  weakness  and  under/over-identiﬁcation  of
he  instrument,  there  is  no  evidence  of  problems  in  the
SLS  estimations.12 In  addition,  we  present  the  ﬁrst-stage
stimations  (Eq.  (6))  in  Table  6  in  Appendix  3.
The  ﬁrst  outcome  that  arises  in  contrasting  the  estimated
oefﬁcient  of  this  exercise  versus  that  estimated  by  OLS  is
hat  the  results  are  convergent  in  terms  of  signiﬁcance  and
xpected  relationships;  thus,  the  interpretations  of  each
ontrol  in  the  models  are  the  same  as  those  in  the  previous
ection.
Secondly,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  estimated  parameters
or  the  amenities  were  over-estimated  in  the  OLS  model,
ontrary  to  the  results  for  the  variables  associated  with
hysical  distance.  Seen  otherwise,  evidence  exists  that  the
ffect  of  factors  that  theoretically  reduce  the  friction  on  the
APC  is  smaller,  while  the  control  parameters  that  would
ncrease  the  friction  are  larger.  This  corroborates  the  third
utcome  --  the  most  important  one  for  this  paper  --  which
s  that  the  estimated  parameter  for  the  homicide  rate  in  all
he  models  was  under-estimated,  which  demonstrates  that
t  is  very  probable  that  the  effect  of  this  crime  modality  on
he  mean  value  of  the  land  in  each  commune  is  even  larger.
ence,  with  the  consistent  result  of  the  2SLS  estimation,  it
an  be  inferred  that  an  increase  of  one  unit  in  the  annual
omicide  rate  could  produce  a  loss  in  the  MAPC  of  up  to  1.66Finally,  a  grouped  observation  of  the  OLS  and  2SLS  results
llows  us  to  comment,  from  an  economic  viewpoint,  that
11 Dollars calculated with TRM at December 31, 2012. Source:
anco de la República.
12 In models (v) and (vi), the non-relevant hypothesis of the
ndogenous variable was rejected at the signiﬁcance level of 10%
ith the Anderson--Rubin F test.
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Table  2  Dependent  variable:  mean  appraisal  of  plot  of  land  per  commune  (MAPC)  in  Cali  2005--2012  (in  logarithms)  --  OLS  estimation.
Variables (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X)  (XI)  (XII)
Constant 18.130  19.437  18.781  18.329  18.577  18.131  17.214  18.527  17.853  17.509  17.523  17.331
(0.271) (0.366)  (0.469)  [0.459]  [0.447]  [0.453]  (0.373)  (0.447)  (0.516)  (0.493)  (0.474)  (0.493)
Physical distance
from  DCC  (kms)
0.016  −0.394 −0.325 −0.277 −0.315 −0.213 0.016  −0.393 −0.321 −0.298 −0.301 −0.243
(0.023)** (0.073)  (0.081)  [0.091]  [0.089]  [0.085]  (0.023)** (0.075)  (0.083)  (0.856)  (0.081)  (0.085)
Physical distance
squared  (kms)
0.030  0.025  0.019  0.021  0.014  0.030  0.025  0.020  0.020  0.016
(0.005) (0.006)  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)
Homicide rate −0.009 −0.012 −0.008 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.009 −0.011 −0.007 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Banks −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
[0.001] [0.001]  [0.001]  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Stratum mode 0.235  0.250  0.227  0.263  0.264  0.256
[0.049] [0.049]  [0.049]  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039)
Malls =  1 0.645  0.656
(0.157) (0.151)
Marketplaces =  1 −0.498 −0.409 −0.455 0.431  −0.423 −0.390
[0.143] [0.137]  [0.142]  (0.102)  (0.111)  (0.101)
MIO stations  =  1 0.253  0.220  0.022  0.015
[0.127] [0.127]* (0.114)** (0.116)**
Parks  =  1 −0.451  −0.391  −0.395  −0.390
−0.228 [0.228]* (0.141)  (0.141)
2006 =  1 0.996  0.988  1.001  1.014  1.015  1.017
(0.304)  (0.278)  (0.252)  (0.231)  (0.232)  (0.228)
2007 =  1 0.976  0.957  0.991  1.006  1.012  1.019
(0.306)  (0.269)  (0.243)  (0.210)  (0.208)  (0.209)
2008 =  1 1.102  1.072  1.127  1.187  1.194  1.202
(0.296)  (0.265)  (0.241)  (0.215)  (0.212)  (0.215)
2009 =  1 1.247  1.257  1.209  1.266  1.275  1.279
(0.301)  (0.263)  (0.243)  (0.217)  (0.214)  (0.217)
2010 =  1 1.135  1.138  1.102  1.172  1.181  1.187
(0.332)  (0.294)  (0.277)  (0.234)  (0.227)  (0.235)
2011 =  1 1.062  1.061  1.034  1.117  1.129  1.139
(0.332)  (0.298)  (0.286)  (0.242)  (0.232)  (0.244)
2012 =  1 0.685  0.686  0.624  0.739  0.752  0.761
(0.320)  (0.274)  (0.256)  (0.221)  (0.213)  (0.221)
Observations 176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176
R2 0.126  0.261  0.313  0.497  0.485  0.485  0.276  0.409  0.461  0.645  0.645  0.637
Communes 22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
** No signiﬁcance (robust standard errors) [homoskedastic errors].
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Table  3  Dependent  variable:  mean  appraisal  of  plot  of  land  per  commune  (MAPC)  in  Cali  2005--2012  (in  logarithms)  Instrumental  variable:  family  violence  rate  (reported
cases per  100,000  people).
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)
Variables  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS
Physical  distance  from
DCC  (kms)
−0.507*** −0.550*** −0.323*** −0.396*** −0.508*** −0.554*** −0.313*** −0.395*** −0.240*** −0.290*** −0.301*** −0.331***
(0.069)  (0.074)  (0.0828)  (0.104)  (0.0706)  (0.0743)  (0.0819)  (0.0936)  (0.0798)  (0.111)  (0.0809)  (0.113)
Physical distance
squared  (kms)
0.0353*** 0.0387*** 0.0223*** 0.0277*** 0.0353*** 0.0389*** 0.0215*** 0.0276*** 0.0156*** 0.0194** 0.0199*** 0.0222***
(0.00459)  (0.00532)  (0.00561)  (0.00735)  (0.00473)  (0.00530)  (0.00543)  (0.00653)  (0.00538)  (0.00813)  (0.00551)  (0.00826)
Homicide rate −0.0106*** −0.0163*** −0.0080*** −0.0128*** −0.0105*** −0.0166*** −0.0076*** −0.0130*** −0.0056*** −0.00837* −0.0058*** −0.00738*
(0.00172)  (0.00355)  (0.00189)  (0.00415)  (0.00167)  (0.00303)  (0.00177)  (0.00326)  (0.00174)  (0.00454)  (0.00179)  (0.00427)
Banks −0.0061*** −0.0057*** −0.0048*** −0.0047*** −0.0062*** −0.0057*** −0.0048*** −0.0048*** −0.0043*** −0.0044*** −0.0041*** −0.0041***
(0.00131)  (0.00121)  (0.00147)  (0.00130)  (0.00116)  (0.00101)  (0.00136)  (0.00113)  (0.00129)  (0.00116)  (0.00128)  (0.00118)
Stratum mode 0.215*** 0.167*** 0.227*** 0.173*** 0.255*** 0.226*** 0.264*** 0.248***
(0.0451)  (0.0613)  (0.0395)  (0.0486)  (0.0391)  (0.0589)  (0.0379)  (0.0557)
Market places  =  1 −0.395*** −0.317* −0.423*** −0.381**
(0.108)  (0.178)  (0.111)  (0.171)
Malls =  1 −0.390*** −0.404***
(0.141)  (0.140)
Constant 20.06*** 20.60*** 18.68*** 19.39*** 19.13*** 19.74*** 17.65*** 18.46*** 17.32*** 17.74*** 17.52*** 17.76***
(0.337)  (0.451)  (0.488)  (0.751)  (0.405)  (0.478)  (0.487)  (0.644)  (0.472)  (0.777)  (0.474)  (0.761)
Economic cycle  effects:
2006--2012
YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES
Communes 22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22
Observations 176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176  176
R-squared 0.390  0.349  0.452  0.426  0.542  0.496  0.611  0.579  0.637  0.630  0.645  0.643
F 18.65  17.34  33.15  28.45  13.18  12.85  22.17  20.15  23.69  22.32  23.70  23.36
Endogeneity (P-val)  0.0440  0.156  0.00666  0.0338  0.500  0.697
Endogeneity of
instrument  (p-val)
0.1722  0.3345  0.0740  0.1758  0.6773
Sanderson--Windmeijer  F  42.69  32.81  52.53  39.66  19.34  20.66
Anderson and  Rubin  F
(p-val)
8.60e−05  0.00416  6.63e−07  0.000122  0.0661  0.0890
Stock--Wright (p-val)  1.68e−05  0.00159  1.94e−07  3.58e−05  0.0330  0.0406
Hansen-J (p-val)  0  0  0  0  0  0
Kleibergen--Paap LM  33.11  24.80  38.41  28.54  18.71  20.11
Kleibergen--Paap F  42.69  32.81  52.53  39.66  19.34  20.66
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. We present the ﬁrst-stage 2SLS estimations models in Table 6 in Appendix 3. Regarding instrument endogeneity, we show the p-value of the instrument
parameter in the estimation of auxiliary regression (7); see Table 5 in Appendix 3.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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homicide’s  adverse  effects  exceed  a  reduction  in  the  real
estate  value,  because  in  fact  they  may  be  more  dam-
aging.  This  applies  more  to  relatively  more  impoverished
communes  of  lower  strata,  which  are  those  that  historically
concentrate  the  phenomenon  in  the  city.  In  other  words,
though  the  estimated  coefﬁcient  that  measures  this  neg-
ative  effect  is  the  same  for  all  the  communes,  homicide
acts  as  a  regressive  tax  due  to  it  producing  proportionally  a
greater  inﬂuence  on  the  wealth  of  the  poorest  population.
9. Conclusion and discussion
This  paper  --  which  could  be  cataloged  as  a  study  of  the
costs  of  violence  --  has  made  a  pertinent  contribution  to  the
investigative  discussion  about  the  adverse  effects  of  homi-
cide  on  the  value  of  real  estate  assets  in  Cali.  It  is  convenient
to  highlight  that  this  research  had  not  previously  been  con-
ducted  for  the  city  in  spite  of  the  complicated  scenario  of
criminality  present  during  recent  years.
From  the  theoretical  and  technical  perspectives,  we  gen-
erated  an  extended  version  of  the  Mills  model  (1972)  that
allowed  us  to  introduce  homicide  as  a  social  distance  fac-
tor;  in  addition,  we  executed  OLS  estimations  --  applying  the
Hausman  (1978)  test  to  contrast  the  endogeneity  between
homicide  and  land  values  --  as  well  as  2SLS  estimations  using
the  family  violence  rate  as  an  instrument,  which  gave  more
robustness  to  the  results.
With  commune  data  (2005--2012),  the  presented  model
enabled  us  to  provide  evidence  that  the  city  does  not  have
a  monocentric  urban  structure  and  that  there  is  no  endo-
geneity  between  the  homicide  rate  and  the  land  prices.
Nevertheless,  the  most  important  result  is  the  ﬁnding  that
in  both  estimation  groups  --  even  including  amenities  --
homicide  reduced  the  appraisal  values  per  commune,  con-
stituting  an  important  impoverishment  mechanism  due  to
the  generation  of  a  negative  effect  on  the  wealth  of  real
estate  proprietors.
Given  this,  the  homicide  effect  could  be  seen  as  a  regres-
sive  tax  with  even  more  perverse  consequences  because  of
the  spatial  concentration  in  lower-strata  areas,  the  poorest
parts  of  the  city,  so  it  may  reasonably  be  assumed  to  be  a
factor  that  systematically  extends  the  social  distance  within
a  city  and  intensiﬁes  the  problem.
A
S-  OLS  estimations  (COP  millions).
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ppendix 1. About the Variables
i.  The  physical  distances  from  the  DCC  were  measured  in
kilometers  from  each  commune  central  point  starting
with  the  shortest  terrestrial  route  based  on  the  Google
Maps  software.
ii. Banks’  quantity  was  measured  in  density  terms  per
1000  hectares  (HA).  Given  that  the  number  of  banks  in
communes  1  and  20  was  zero  (0),  we  reasonably  sup-
pose  that  the  proxy  for  this  variable  is  the  banks  in  the
nearest  communes,  that  is,  1  and  19.
ii.  Some  appraisal  data  per  commune  were  outliers  or
seemed  to  be  badly  typed  in  the  Cali  en  Cifras  docu-
ments,  so  they  were  averaged  using  the  previous  and
subsequent  observations  (communes  19  and  21  in  2006
and  communes  7  and  21  in  2005).
iv.  Marketplaces  are  public  spaces  to  commercialize  farm
and  food  products  as  well  as  crafts  and  other  home  ele-
ments.
v.  It  considers  as  large  parks  those  with  areas  that  exceed
100,000  m2.  This  criterion  is  due  to  the  existence  of  an
abundance  of  these  spaces  in  the  city,  but  large  parks
are  few  and,  hence,  could  have  a  differential  effect  on
the  land  prices.
i.  The  family  violence  cases  for  commune  22  between
2005  and  2007  were  approximated  with  the  2008  value
due  to  this  period  being  included  in  the  observations  of
commune  17.  Naturally,  later  they  were  deducted  from
commune  17  to  avoid  double  counting.
ppendix 2. Hausman test and model
election statistics
ee  Table  4.ppendix 3. Additional estimations
ee  Tables  5  and  6.
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Table  4  Selection  model  statistics  and  the  Hausman  endogeneity  test  in  OLS  estimations.
Statistics  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X)  (XI)  (XII)
Bayesian
(BIC)
478.8 454.5  446.7  412.7  411.7  411.6  482.0  451.3  440.0  387.2  382.1  386.4
Akaike
(AIC)
469.3 441.8  430.8  384.2  386.3  386.2  450.3  416.4  402.0  336.5  334.5  338.9
Hausman
(Prob >  Chi2)
0.986  0.002  0.001  0.177  0.023  0.151  0.808  0.029  0.063  0.389  0.195  0.381
Lower BIC and AIC statistics indicate a better adjustment of the model. Hausman: if Prob >0.05, there are no systematic differences in
the coefﬁcients; that is, the variable ‘‘homicide rate’’ is exogenous.
Table  5  Auxiliary  regression  estimations.  Dependent  variables:  predicted  errors  in  the  OLS  estimations  of  Table  3.
Variables  u  i  u  ii  u  iii  u  iv  u  v  u  vi
Family  violence  rate  (cases
per  100,000  persons)
−0.000398  −0.000267  −0.000450*  −0.000315  −9.38e−05  −5.34e−05
(0.000290)  (0.000276)  (0.000251)  (0.000232)  (0.000225)  (0.000222)
Constant 0.137 0.0921  0.155  0.109  0.0324  0.0184
(0.115) (0.109)  (0.0994)  (0.0920)  (0.0893)  (0.0882)
Observations  176  176  176  176  176  176
R-squared 0.011  0.005  0.018  0.011  0.001  0.000
R2 adjusted  0.00500  −0.000365  0.0126  0.00482  −0.00474  −0.00541
F 1.879  0.936  3.230  1.847  0.174  0.0577
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.1.
Table  6  First-stage  estimations  in  2SLS  models.  Dependent  variable:  homicide  rate  (reported  cases  per  100,000  people  per
Cali commune  2005--2012).
Variables  fs  (i)  fs  (ii)  fs  (iii)  fs  (iv)  fs  (v)  fs  (vi)
Family  violence
rate
0.0935*** 0.0802*** 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.0808*** 0.0836***
(0.0143)  (0.0140)  (0.0159)  (0.0160)  (0.0184)  (0.0184)
Physical distance
from  DCC  (kms)
−15.55*** −19.62*** −17.47*** −20.75*** −21.08*** −23.25***
(3.157)  (3.119)  (2.990)  (2.899)  (2.897)  (3.375)
Physical distance
squared  (kms)
1.136*** 1.421*** 1.263*** 1.494*** 1.546*** 1.697***
(0.220)  (0.217)  (0.217)  (0.207)  (0.210)  (0.253)
Banks −0.0573  −0.0867  −0.0919** −0.113** −0.106** −0.0995**
(0.0504)  (0.0534)  (0.0452)  (0.0482)  (0.0464)  (0.0472)
Stratum mode −6.825*** −5.864*** −6.960*** −6.428***
(1.792)  (1.812)  (1.808)  (1.890)
Marketplace  =  1 13.63** 11.87**
(5.435)  (5.408)
Parks =  1 −14.15
(8.719)
Constant 93.57*** 129.8*** 96.35*** 127.8*** 133.3*** 138.7***
(11.16)  (14.36)  (13.08)  (16.40)  (16.38)  (16.65)
Economic cycle  effects:  2006--2012 YES  YES  YES  YES
Communes  22  22  22  22  22  22
Observations  176  176  176  176  176  176
R-squared 0.268  0.317  0.347  0.382  0.402  0.410
R2 adjusted  0.251  0.297  0.303  0.337  0.354  0.359
F 14.62  19.44  7.994  11  11.27  10.82
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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